⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems
Agency might be thought to occur Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems in the act of interpretation of sense datamaking choices about how Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems allocate meanings to those Montag In Fahrenheit 451 Essay. The ethical domain, Harman argue, Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems such that all relevant Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems could Importance Of Jurisprudence undertaken only in the context of social norms or personal preferences and commitments. So, once we accept the insight that there is no Archimedean vantage point for choosing among conflicting frameworks, we no longer face a Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems contradiction. Dewey rejected the atomistic understanding of society of the Hobbesian social Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems theory, Arguments Against Phages to Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems the social, Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems aspect of human life was grounded in the logically prior and fully articulated rational Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems of individuals. Social Constructionists: Subjectivist Reasoning For Social Problems, Plato also ascribes a social or ethical dimension to Protagorean relativism which seem to go beyond individualistic subjectivism.
UMA Social Problems: Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches
I believe that people will tend to seek an understanding of the universe they work. I also think that people will always develop the subjective meanings of their experiences. The meanings are multiple and at the same time varied. This limits the bounds of a qualitative researcher as he or she depends on the views, opinions, and ideas of the participants. Individuals derive their comprehension of things through their involvement in trying to make sense of events taking place in the world. My worldview complies with the ontological characteristics of a qualitative paradigm thereby indicating a significant alignment.
The methodological argument brings in the idea of using interviews and questionnaires as a way of collecting meanings from people. This is also addressed under social constructivism. As a social constructivist, the alignment of my worldview with the quantitative model is not as strong as the one established by the qualitative paradigm. This is because constructivism primarily concentrates on the lives of people. For this reason, they leave out the aspect of meaningful actions demanded under the quantitative model.
However, it is said that social constructivism partially focuses on historical experiences. This brings in the comparative platform that leads to the ultimate introduction of analytical tools. The analysis is seen as the backbone of the quantitative paradigm, meaning that the compliance favors the methodological view of the quantitative characteristics. With such arguments, the worldview alignment is significant but not strong De Vicq, The discussion insists on the comparison between the characteristics of qualitative and quantitative paradigms. The introduction takes into consideration the ultimate definition of the two research platforms.
Part 1 of this paper has delved into the discussion in deducing the primary characteristics of each Qualitative and Quantitative paradigm based on philosophical, ontological, epistemological and methodological arguments. The second part addresses the alignment of social constructivism with both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms.
Holstein, J. Reconsidering social constructionism: Debates in social problems theory. New York: Aldine Transaction Publishers. De Vicq, R. The effects of meditation on the mental and physical health of healthcare workers. Dixon-Woods, M. Synthesising qualitative and quantitative evidence: a review of possible methods. Onwuegbuzie, A. Quality and Quantity , 39 3 , Phillimore, J. Qualitative research in tourism: Ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. With this view as his starting point, Dewey developed a broad body of work encompassing virtually all of the main areas of philosophical concern in his day. He also wrote extensively on social issues in such popular publications as the New Republic , thereby gaining a reputation as a leading social commentator of his time.
The eldest sibling died in infancy, but the three surviving brothers attended the public school and the University of Vermont in Burlington with John. While at the University of Vermont, Dewey was exposed to evolutionary theory through the teaching of G. Perkins and Lessons in Elementary Physiology, a text by T. Huxley, the famous English evolutionist. The formal teaching in philosophy at the University of Vermont was confined for the most part to the school of Scottish realism, a school of thought that Dewey soon rejected, but his close contact both before and after graduation with his teacher of philosophy, H.
After graduation in , Dewey taught high school for two years, during which the idea of pursuing a career in philosophy took hold. With this nascent ambition in mind, he sent a philosophical essay to W. Harris, then editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and the most prominent of the St. Louis Hegelians. With this encouragement he traveled to Baltimore to enroll as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University.
At Johns Hopkins Dewey came under the tutelage of two powerful and engaging intellects who were to have a lasting influence on him. George Sylvester Morris, a German-trained Hegelian philosopher, exposed Dewey to the organic model of nature characteristic of German idealism. Stanley Hall, one of the most prominent American experimental psychologists at the time, provided Dewey with an appreciation of the power of scientific methodology as applied to the human sciences. Upon obtaining his doctorate in , Dewey accepted a teaching post at the University of Michigan, a post he was to hold for ten years, with the exception of a year at the University of Minnesota in At Michigan Dewey also met one of his important philosophical collaborators, James Hayden Tufts, with whom he would later author Ethics ; revised ed.
In , Dewey followed Tufts to the recently founded University of Chicago. Dewey also founded and directed a laboratory school at Chicago, where he was afforded an opportunity to apply directly his developing ideas on pedagogical method. This experience provided the material for his first major work on education, The School and Society His philosophical reputation now secured, he was quickly invited to join the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University. Dewey spent the rest of his professional life at Columbia.
Now in New York, located in the midst of the Northeastern universities that housed many of the brightest minds of American philosophy, Dewey developed close contacts with many philosophers working from divergent points of view, an intellectually stimulating atmosphere which served to nurture and enrich his thought. During his first decade at Columbia Dewey wrote a great number of articles in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, many of which were published in two important books: The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought and Essays in Experimental Logic His interest in educational theory also continued during these years, fostered by his work at Teachers College at Columbia. This led to the publication of How We Think ; revised ed.
One outcome of this fame was numerous invitations to lecture in both academic and popular venues. Many of his most significant writings during these years were the result of such lectures, including Reconstruction in Philosophy , Human Nature and Conduct , Experience and Nature , The Public and its Problems , and The Quest for Certainty Dewey continued to work vigorously throughout his retirement until his death on June 2, , at the age of ninety-two.
The commitment of modern rationalism, stemming from Descartes, to a doctrine of innate ideas, ideas constituted from birth in the very nature of the mind itself, had effected this dichotomy; but the modern empiricists, beginning with Locke, had done the same just as markedly by their commitment to an introspective methodology and a representational theory of ideas. The resulting view makes a mystery of the relevance of thought to the world: if thought constitutes a domain that stands apart from the world, how can its accuracy as an account of the world ever be established?
For Dewey a new model, rejecting traditional presumptions, was wanting, a model that Dewey endeavored to develop and refine throughout his years of writing and reflection. But during the succeeding decade Dewey gradually came to reject this solution as confused and inadequate. For one, Hegelian idealism was not conducive to accommodating the methodologies and results of experimental science which he accepted and admired. The key to the naturalistic account of species was a consideration of the complex interrelationships between organisms and environments.
In a similar way, Dewey came to believe that a productive, naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge must begin with a consideration of the development of knowledge as an adaptive human response to environing conditions aimed at an active restructuring of these conditions. In this article, Dewey argued that the dominant conception of the reflex arc in the psychology of his day, which was thought to begin with the passive stimulation of the organism, causing a conscious act of awareness eventuating in a response, was a carry-over of the old, and errant, mind-body dualism. Dewey argued for an alternative view: the organism interacts with the world through self-guided activity that coordinates and integrates sensory and motor responses.
The implication for the theory of knowledge was clear: the world is not passively perceived and thereby known; active manipulation of the environment is involved integrally in the process of learning from the start. Dewey first applied this interactive naturalism in an explicit manner to the theory of knowledge in his four introductory essays in Studies in Logical Theory. Dewey identified the view expressed in Studies with the school of pragmatism, crediting William James as its progenitor. James, for his part, in an article appearing in the Psychological Bulletin , proclaimed the work as the expression of a new school of thought, acknowledging its originality.
Dewey distinguished three phases of the process. It begins with the problematic situation , a situation where instinctive or habitual responses of the human organism to the environment are inadequate for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the fulfillment of needs and desires. Dewey stressed in Studies and subsequent writings that the uncertainty of the problematic situation is not inherently cognitive, but practical and existential. Cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to precognitive maladjustment. The second phase of the process involves the isolation of the data or subject matter which defines the parameters within which the reconstruction of the initiating situation must be addressed.
In the third, reflective phase of the process, the cognitive elements of inquiry ideas, suppositions, theories, etc. The final test of the adequacy of these solutions comes with their employment in action. If a reconstruction of the antecedent situation conducive to fluid activity is achieved, then the solution no longer retains the character of the hypothetical that marks cognitive thought; rather, it becomes a part of the existential circumstances of human life.
The error of modern epistemologists, as Dewey saw it, was that they isolated the reflective stages of this process, and hypostatized the elements of those stages sensations, ideas, etc. For Dewey, the hypostatization was as groundless as the search for incorrigibility was barren. Rejecting foundationalism, Dewey accepted the fallibilism that was characteristic of the school of pragmatism: the view that any proposition accepted as an item of knowledge has this status only provisionally, contingent upon its adequacy in providing a coherent understanding of the world as the basis for human action. Dewey defended this general outline of the process of inquiry throughout his long career, insisting that it was the only proper way to understand the means by which we attain knowledge, whether it be the commonsense knowledge that guides the ordinary affairs of our lives, or the sophisticated knowledge arising from scientific inquiry.
The latter is only distinguished from the former by the precision of its methods for controlling data, and the refinement of its hypotheses. In his writings in the theory of inquiry subsequent to Studies, Dewey endeavored to develop and deepen instrumentalism by considering a number of central issues of traditional epistemology from its perspective, and responding to some of the more trenchant criticisms of the view. One traditional question that Dewey addressed in a series of essays between and was that of the meaning of truth. Dewey at that time considered the pragmatic theory of truth as central to the pragmatic school of thought, and vigorously defended its viability. The pragmatic theory of truth met with strong opposition among its critics, perhaps most notably from the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell.
Dewey later began to suspect that the issues surrounding the conditions of truth, as well as knowledge, were hopelessly obscured by the accretion of traditional, and in his view misguided, meanings to the terms, resulting in confusing ambiguity. One of the most important developments of his later writings in the theory of knowledge was the application of the principles of instrumentalism to the traditional conceptions and formal apparatus of logical theory. Dewey made significant headway in this endeavor in his lengthy introduction to Essays in Experimental Logic , but the project reached full fruition in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
What is distinctive about intelligent inquiry is that it is facilitated by the use of language, which allows, by its symbolic meanings and implication relationships, the hypothetical rehearsal of adaptive behaviors before their employment under actual, prevailing conditions for the purpose of resolving problematic situations. Logical form, the specialized subject matter of traditional logic, owes its genesis not to rational intuition, as had often been assumed by logicians, but due to its functional value in 1 managing factual evidence pertaining to the problematic situation that elicits inquiry, and 2 controlling the procedures involved in the conceptualized entertainment of hypothetical solutions.
From this new perspective, Dewey reconsiders many of the topics of traditional logic, such as the distinction between deductive and inductive inference, propositional form, and the nature of logical necessity. The positivist tradition stresses the importance of doing quantitative research such as large scale surveys in order to get an overview of society as a whole and to uncover social trends, such as the relationship between educational achievement and social class. This type of sociology is more interested in trends and patterns rather than individuals. This is known as the comparative method. Interpretivism An Interpretivist approach to social research would be much more qualitative, using methods such as unstructured interviews or participant observation Interpretivists , or anti-positivists argue that individuals are not just puppets who react to external social forces as Positivists believe.